

## **Position Paper**

Brussels, 04 February 2016

# **Rail Security**

---

# Summary

**Following the current discussions on rail security at EU level, and given the growing expectations for the European Commission, the Member States as well as the railway sector to take appropriate actions in the field of rail security, CER presents this Position paper on rail security in order to contribute towards any further political discussion in this field.**

## 1. General response to rail security

In March 2013, CER issued a Position paper on land transport security with the objective of commenting on the Commission Staff Working Document on Transport Security (SWD (2012) 143) published on 31 May 2012 and to provide feedback to the **Commission's Expert Group on Land Transport Security (LANDSEC)**, which started its activities with its first meeting on 30 January 2013.

CER appreciates the establishment of the expert group and strongly supports the Commission's decision not to introduce any further legislation in the field of rail security but to instead use this group **as a platform where the Commission, Member States and stakeholders can exchange good practices**. As a member of the expert group, CER has been following its activities ever since, representing the interests of the railway sector.

Overall, CER supports the action of the EU to continue addressing the issue of rail security. However, any **EU action** must be **in conformity with the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality** and must **create clear added value** for rail security and European countries and their citizens as a whole. Therefore, there is a need for proper analysis and evaluation of **any possible measures** prescribed by the EU, which **need to be flexible** in order **to enable a proper response to quickly evolving security threats**.

It should be borne in mind that the **railway systems are very different** from those of the aviation and maritime sectors, thus railways **necessitate different approaches and security measures**. The **flexibility of rail as an open-access transport mode** requires the preservation of present structures which have evolved over the years and are both workable and in line with the system's needs.

Within the work programme of **LANDSEC**, CER is in favour of **further working on metal theft**. Different meetings and workshops have already been organised so far on this topic, which have helped stakeholders to identify common interests and to make common suggestions to the European decision-makers (*Follow the link to access the statement: [European coalition against metal theft: Joint call for actions](#)*). CER therefore calls on LANDSEC to further address this dossier in close cooperation with DG HOME in order to elaborate on the basis of this first positive outcome and to fine-tune a European policy answer.

Other topics that were already identified as relevant by stakeholders have not received enough attention in the past months: e.g. **graffiti, anti-social behaviour**. CER urges LANDSEC to put them on the agenda of its work programme, as they have significant negative consequences for railways and their customers. Exchange of good practices on these aspects would be valuable.

Generally, railways note that **serious and organised crime and terrorism** have proven to be very topical in the past few months. Although the fight against organised crime and terrorism is not primarily the responsibility of the EU institutions, the **Commission should continue to provide support to the Member States** to combat serious and organised crime and to prevent any possible terrorist attack, where appropriate and within the remit of its competences.

## 2. Response to specific aspects of rail security

### Cooperation between law enforcement authorities and across Member States

CER very much welcomes stronger European coordination and cooperation between law enforcement authorities (intelligence, police, customs...), keeping railways informed and involved when needed, and encourages better exchange of information and intelligence across Europe at the law enforcement level. It is important to exchange information both between the different law enforcement authorities and between the Member States, especially with regard to cross-border operations. This would enable better and wider awareness of emerging or changing threats, faster response times and more efficient use of synergies and coordinated security measures, generating added value at EU level for improving security.

CER agrees that railways should be prepared to react adequately to and in cooperation and coordination with their respective national authorities to take suitable measures during and after a security incident. Already, the railways organise regular security-related exercises in consultation with or even with the involvement of responsible national authorities. The cooperation and coordination mechanisms of the activities of law enforcement authorities and railways play a crucial role and should be further strengthened.

In general, CER supports the Commission's objective of making passenger and freight land transport more resilient to security threats. However, the clear division of competences and responsibilities for (national) security between states, their security authorities and railways needs to be respected. National security is a government task which falls within the responsibility of the security authorities with the support of transport operators.

Moreover, the different legislative frameworks, practices and structural differences between Member States also need to be recognised, as there is no true one-size-fits-all approach to rail security in Europe.

### Rail security and terrorism

Large crowds of people and especially public places are potentially attractive targets for terrorists. However this is a general security problem and not specific to railways. The same circumstances exist, for example, at shopping malls, in shopping streets, at funfairs and at trade fairs.

Existing security concepts and approaches are comprehensive for all kinds of rail services. The challenge is to even further increase the already high level of railway security and at the same time to ensure that the European network remains functional.

Ultimately, there is no such thing as 100 % security and complete protection of the entire railway network would be impossible, not just because of its length and the need to maintain passenger flow, but also due to financial and human resource implications. The approach to security needs to react to threat levels and security requirements should be in proportion to security risks.

Rail transport as a mass transit system and an open-access transport mode cannot have airport-style security measures in place (*To give an example, in terms of passenger numbers, the busiest airport in the EU in 2013 was London Heathrow (72.3 million),*

followed by Paris' Charles de Gaulle airport (61.9 million), Frankfurt airport (57.9 million) and Amsterdam's Schiphol airport (52.5 million). [See the link](#). The largest number of rail passengers pass through London Waterloo (200 million), followed by Paris' Gare du Nord (180 million), London's Victoria Station (175 million) and London's King's Cross/St. Pancras (170 million). [See the link](#). The railway system is integrated within the urban environment. Therefore, stations, very often situated in the city centres, are used not only by passengers but also as commercial spaces by other citizens. As such, the railway premises need to be accessible to all users without them having to go through security checks. Furthermore, railway infrastructure also needs to offer a high level of flexibility, including multiple access points, not least because of the high passenger volumes that have to be coped with daily. It should be noted that station entrances also serve as emergency exits.

Different modifications in order to provide security checks could jeopardise the continuous functioning capacity of the entire existing system. Given the layout and configuration of the railway stations, this may even be simply impossible to implement in many cases. Moreover, systematic security screening would cause long queues that could in turn become potentially attractive targets for malicious acts or attacks. Passengers would also be required to arrive at the station a long time in advance to undergo this screening, which would completely change the perceived journey duration and is likely to incentivise passengers to opt for another mode of transport (such as an individual car).

CER believes that such mandatory measures should be rejected, as they neither meet the specific requirements of the railways or their customers' needs nor could they be implemented without generating cost increases for the entire industry that would be disproportionate to the level of threat. Considering the vast dimensions of the rail infrastructure it would be important to define the different ways of financing security measures.

Rather than considering the implementation of systematic screening in isolation from the whole security chain, railways and public authorities should rather develop a comprehensive security strategy based on a strong presence of railways' security staff, where available, cooperation between them and national police forces in stations and on board trains, who could e.g. patrol with a police dog team, the use of technological solutions (e.g. CCTV) where relevant, as well as a culture of collective vigilance. At the same time, it is crucial that the security actions of law enforcement authorities do not impede the usual traffic flow.

CER therefore calls on the decision-makers to bear in mind these potential consequences in terms of acceptance of the security measures by the general public and in terms of the business model of rail transport. New themes can be identified for reflection and sharing of good practices in this context, such as the detection and management of suspicious luggage and packages. This includes intensifying cooperation in the existing international bodies which deal with questions of transport security on an operational and technical level (such as LANDSEC, COLPOFER and UIC).

### **Security staff training and security awareness**

CER agrees that security awareness needs to be addressed in every railway company. In general, security awareness should be raised not only at company level but also with the public. Everybody, not only members of railway staff, should be alert to spot suspicious

items and behaviour and know what to do should they become aware of them. However, neither railway staff nor the general public can play the role of law enforcement authorities.

Even though there is already ongoing staff training among CER members on how to behave and respond in different situations, CER would welcome further exchange of good practices at EU level or the development of guidelines for railway companies and national authorities. Such guidelines should take into account the different legislative frameworks among EU Member States as well as the specific roles that different employees play within their companies. Responsibility for security (at national level), threat and risk levels also need to be taken into account when developing such guidelines. Whilst CER supports a comprehensive initial and lifelong training for security staff, other commercial staff who are not directly entrusted with security missions could benefit from lighter *information* sessions.

## **Cyber-security**

Railway companies already have some measures in place to secure their network and information systems, since it is also in their interest to ensure a high level of cyber-security in order to prevent potential incidents. CER realises the importance of this issue, as on the one hand rail transport will become more and more dependent on information and communication technology and, on the other, cyber-crime can be expected to continue to grow, both in scope and sophistication.

As part of the 'Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace', the European Commission adopted the proposal for a 'Directive concerning measures to ensure a high common level of network and information security across the Union' (COM(2013)048) in February 2013. CER very much welcomed the Commission's proposal and the efforts made by the EU institutions throughout the whole legislative process to adopt such a piece of legislation ensuring a high level of network and information security in all Member States.

In order to ensure that rail transport is even more resilient to cyber-attacks, CER is particularly supportive of any guidance that the EU is able to provide in this area. The EU should help to raise awareness and increase knowledge about potential risks and how to mitigate them, as well as help to highlight weaknesses which could leave railways vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Ultimately, the security requirements need to be proportionate to the threats.

## **Security technology solutions**

Technologies are already being used by railway companies and different solutions are increasingly deployed at stations and on trains (e.g. CCTV, automatic recognition of suspects, etc.). It is therefore crucial for the development and use of technology solutions to be driven by the needs of the railway sector rather than by suppliers of security systems. Furthermore, the sustainability and the overall competitiveness of rail also need to be taken into account.

Some difficulties arise in using different technology solutions due to specific national legislation, e.g. data protection. CER supports further research in this field at EU level, under programmes such as Horizon 2020, among others.

---

### **About CER**

The Community of European Railway and Infrastructure Companies (CER) brings together more than 70 railway undertakings, their national associations as well as infrastructure managers and vehicle leasing companies. The membership is made up of long-established bodies, new entrants and both private and public enterprises, representing 73% of the rail network length, 80% of the rail freight business and about 96% of rail passenger operations in EU, EFTA and EU accession countries. CER represents the interests of its members towards EU policy makers and transport stakeholders, advocating rail as the backbone of a competitive and sustainable transport system in Europe. For more information, visit [www.cer.be](http://www.cer.be) or follow us via Twitter at @CER\_railways.

This CER document is for public information.

Although every effort is made to ensure the accuracy of the information in this document, CER cannot be held responsible for any information from external sources, technical inaccuracies, typographical errors or other errors herein. Information and links may have changed without notice.